

201
/98
E 713
.C95
Copy 1

E. D. Crumpacker 10000

M. F. R

Annexation of Hawaiian Islands.

SPEECH
OF
HON. E. D. CRUMPACKER,
OF INDIANA,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Tuesday, June 14, 1898.

The House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—

Mr. CRUMPACKER said:

Mr. SPEAKER: I am opposed to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to this country because, upon the whole, it appears to me that the project would bring more burdens than benefits. It probably would bring some benefits, for it is hard to conceive of a scheme so wild that has not some compensatory features. But, sir, in a matter of such grave importance as this, involving, as it does, a radical change of our historical policy, it ought not to receive our sanction unless it is clear, considering its future as well as its present effects, that there is a decided preponderance of advantage in it, and every doubt should be resolved against the proposition.

We should accept nothing by faith alone in a matter of such transcendent importance. It is claimed that the people of this country, almost as a unit, are in favor of the proposition. That assertion I deny; the masses of the people have given the subject very little thought, but almost every expression from the farmers and wage earners has been against it. It is true, there appears to be considerable sentiment in its favor, judging from public prints and utterances, but even that is largely sentiment, that has not ripened into conviction. It has been well said that one noisy man will make more noise than forty quiet ones; and that aphorism is peculiarly true of the situation respecting the question of annexation.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT.

In the first place, the resolutions ought to be defeated because it is an attempt to accomplish by the legislative department of the Government that which the organic law clearly requires to be done by the Executive. Without entering upon an analysis of the Federal Constitution, I desire to advert to the fact that each department of the Government is and must be independent of the others, and it would be dangerous and revolutionary for one department to arrogate functions and powers vested by the Constitution in the others. Under the division of powers the President has absolutely no legislative authority except the qualified negative in the form of the veto. Every member of this House will admit not only that the President has constitutional authority to negotiate for the annexation of territory, subject to the approval of the Senate, but that his is the only proper agency to accomplish that end, because it involves the exercise of the treaty-making power exclusively vested in the President by the Constitution.

E713
295
68051
P.
Mr. W. A. Smith

The question is purely an executive one, without a single legislative feature. There is no express authority in the Federal Constitution for the acquisition of territory, and in the early history of the Republic the existence of that authority was denied by many able statesmen. But the always convenient doctrine of inherent power was conceived, and now no one questions the authority of the people through their constitutional agencies to enlarge the public domain by the annexation of additional territory. But every lawyer must admit that negotiations for the annexation of outlying territory are executive in character, regardless of the form in which they are placed. The legislative formula, "*Be it resolved, etc.*," can not change a proposition essentially executive in its character to one of a legislative nature.

This body has no executive powers whatever, excepting such as are incident to its own organization and government. Negotiations for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands were first entered upon by the President in the form of a treaty with those assuming to act for the islands, containing the same provisions as the pending resolutions; but the treaty required the assent of two-thirds of the Senators, and it became apparent that it could not command that assent, so it has been abandoned and this expedient invented to evade the limitations of the Constitution. The simplest treaty with a foreign country must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senators, but it is gravely claimed that a treaty of annexation affecting the destiny of the whole nation may be sanctioned by a bare majority of the Senators.

Any measure that fails to receive the sanction of the people, through their constitutional organism, ought to be defeated in an attempt to subvert the Constitution, whatever may be its merits. The preservation of the constitutional limitations and guarantys is of infinitely greater importance than the acquisition of new territory, however desirable. No end will justify means of such a revolutionary character. But it is claimed that a precedent exists for the proposed action in the acquisition of Texas. It is true that Texas was admitted into the Union by a joint resolution of Congress, after a treaty for its annexation had failed to be ratified by the Senate, but it was admitted as a State and not as a Territory.

Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution, confers upon Congress the power to admit new States into the Union, and it was insisted that as Texas was to be admitted into the Union as a State and not annexed as a Territory it could be done by joint resolution. That doctrine was combated by the ablest lawyers and statesmen of the time, on the ground that the power to admit States into the Union embraced only States created out of territory already a part of the national domain. Congress took the other view, however, and Texas was admitted into the Union as a State by joint resolution, and the action was acquiesced in by the people. But never in the history of the country has territory been admitted as such by joint resolution or by Congressional action.

Florida, Louisiana, and Alaska were annexed by treaty, and California by conquest. The attempts to annex St. Thomas and the Dominican Republic were by treaty, and not by joint resolution. Upon the failure of the treaty to annex San Domingo President Grant suggested that it be done by Congressional action, but the power to so acquire it was quite generally denied. Senator Thurman, of Ohio, one of the ablest lawyers of the country, in discussing the question, said:

You can not by joint resolution annex San Domingo as a Territory; you must annex her as a State if you annex her by joint resolution. There is no clause in the Constitution that provides for the acquisition of territory by joint resolution,

unless it be that Congress may admit new States into the Union. It was upon the argument that there was no limitation upon that power to admit new States into the Union; that it was not limited to territory belonging to the United States, but that territory belonging to a foreign power might be admitted into the Union as a State. It was upon that doctrine that the resolution in the case of Texas was passed. But no one has ever pretended that you could by joint resolution annex territory as a Territory without admitting it as a State.

The history of this country affords no precedent for the annexation of territory as such by joint resolution of Congress, and any such attempt is clearly repugnant to the Constitution.

The Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the views of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of *Insurance Company v. Canter* (1 Peters, 512), that the constitutional methods of acquiring additional territory are by treaty and conquest. Will anyone contend that this body has any share in the treaty-making power? I assert, as a proposition of law, that the House of Representatives and the President possess no concurrent powers. If the pending proposition is legislative in its character the President had no authority to negotiate the treaty in the first place, and if it is executive this body has no constitutional authority over it whatever. It is altogether probable that if the resolutions shall pass both branches of Congress and receive Executive approval no one will ever question our title to the islands, but the habit of inventing subterfuge to evade the plain provisions of the Constitution is dangerous and destructive in its tendencies.

Suppose the President should disagree to the resolutions and should veto them and they should subsequently pass both branches of Congress by a two-thirds vote, notwithstanding the veto, would it be claimed that annexation so attempted would have any constitutional sanction? I apprehend not. The courts have no authority to review the exercise of political powers, and for this reason greater caution should characterize the action of the Government, because of the danger of overriding established limitations by insidious encroachment.

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.

I am opposed to the project because it will incorporate into our political system territory over 2,000 miles from our coast, under a blazing, tropical sun—territory that can contribute but little to the greatness of the Republic and will necessarily detract from the high standard of its citizenship. The dignity of labor is the glory of our civilization, and its standard can never be lowered without material injury to the general welfare. White labor never has gone into tropical countries and it never will go there. It is proposed to annex territory capable of supporting a million people, in which all labor must be performed by people of a very low order of civil and industrial life, and bring them into direct competition with the high-class, intelligent labor of the States.

That policy, sir, has been repeatedly repudiated by the people of this country at the polls. The protection of American labor from competition with the cheap labor of other countries has been a cardinal doctrine of the Republican party ever since its organization. The ingenuity of our statesmanship is now being taxed to invent methods of removing convict labor from competition with free labor, and yet it is asserted that it will not degrade the intelligent labor of America to put it into direct competition with ill-paid sea-island, Japanese, and Chinese workmen. That competition can not be avoided if annexation shall be accomplished. Unity of interest, sentiment, and destiny, so far as it can be attained, is highly necessary to the happiness of our people and the perpetuity of Republican institutions, and we are already so diversified that

perplexing and dangerous political and economical problems confront us, demanding solution.

The difference in the degree of development in various parts of the country are so marked that ugly antagonisms exist and popular discontent is fomented. Measures adapted to one section are unsuited to the demands of another, and legislation, general in its scope, must be so compromised to secure something near equality of operation, that its efficiency is in a large degree impaired. These discordant elements constitute the gravest danger with which we have to contend, whether domestic or foreign. Gentlemen contend that laws may be made for the government of colonial acquisitions, adapted to the degree of civil development, and that we need not admit the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands into full political partnership with us until it is deemed expedient.

The principle that all citizens are equal before the law is the bed-rock of Republican institutions, and a policy that will discriminate between citizens is repugnant to the genius of free government. Equality is the soul of the Republic, and it is the beginning of the end when this great country can find excuses to make invidious distinctions between its own citizens. Besides this, there is no place in our political system for permanent colonial governments. The Constitution contemplates that every foot of territory within our dominion, outside of the District of Columbia, shall ultimately form part of a State with a citizenship equal to that of all the States. The Federal Supreme Court, in the famous Dred Scott decision, declared that—

There is no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish and maintain colonies bordering on the United States, nor at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its pleasure, nor to enlarge its territorial limits, except by the admission of new States: * * * The power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all the Departments of the Government it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority.

What becomes of the policy advanced by annexationists that the Government can permanently control the islands by a system fitted to their situation, capacity, and development? It is not the policy of the Government to admit any class of people into the political household that can not intelligently and helpfully participate in free government and profit by its privileges. I confess that I have some sentiment upon the question of citizenship. I love to look upon my fellow-citizen with the consciousness that, however humble his station in life, he is the equal before the law of the greatest in the land, and that from his loins may spring a posterity that will bless humanity and glorify republican institutions. A race that does not possess these splendid possibilities must lower the dignity of our citizenship.

The marvelous growth and uneven development of the country are largely responsible for present conditions, and many of our most troublesome questions will be removed by time. Our interests will be more equitably adjusted and grow into more harmonious relations with further development. The standard of life in all parts of the country must be measured according to a common scale, and we have now as great a diversification of climate, resource, and tendency as can be successfully trained together under one political organization. The Temperate Zone, by inexorable law, has always contained, and always will contain, the highest intelligence of the world and all that is most helpful in civilized life. The tropical climate stifles growth and impedes progress in the individual, and,

of course, in society, for the individual is the social unit. Our exigencies should be pressing indeed to justify the incorporation into our social system of territory which, from its unalterable conditions, can not keep pace with us in our march to a higher destiny.

The situation certainly does not justify that radical departure at this time, and I sincerely hope it never will. The islands are as widely separated from us socially and industrially as they are physically. There is not a single tendency or interest in common between us, and our destinies are unalterably divergent. The people of the islands are incapable of self-government, and always will be. No progressive republic can ever endure in the torrid zone. The infusion of that exotic into our national currents will tend to corrupt our whole system; it will be a festering sore in the body politic, to irritate and annoy for all time. A pressing necessity is recognized for the exclusion from our domain of immigrants whose influence upon our institutions would be deleterious, and yet it is proposed to introduce at one coup a whole race of people so stolid and unresponsive in their very natures that they can not be assimilated by our civilizing forces.

The suggestion that the Mongolians shall be excluded from the islands when they shall have passed under our control is no remedy, for the natives are equally objectionable, and no desirable people can become inured to that environment. The climate and soil preclude the hope of a high civilization, and if the islands should be stocked with the best Anglo-Saxon blood they would degenerate into a race of indolents in a few generations, under the influence of the enervating surroundings. He who declares to the contrary disputes an immutable law of individual development and goes into the face of all history and experience.

Do we want a country incapable of keeping step with us to the inspiring music of progress, a country that will operate as a check, a drawback, to our forward movement? Insular possessions so far away from the continent would add to the causes for international complications and embarrassments and become a luxuriant soil for the growth of political peculation and scandal.

THE COMMERCE OF THE ISLANDS.

Much has been said about the importance to us of the trade of the islands. Those who have given the matter careful consideration for years past must know that their trade has been an expensive luxury. It is unquestionably true that the islands produce staple articles of commerce similar to those produced by other tropical countries, but they do not contribute a single article to the world's trade the like of which can not be gotten elsewhere. The surroundings and habits of living of the inhabitants are such that they require comparatively few of the products of this country. Their trade naturally belongs to us to the extent that it is mutually beneficial, and their geographical situation guarantees us almost absolute control of it without annexation or treaty concessions.

It is not necessary to admit them to our political fireside in order to obtain that which we can have without. It would be dearly purchased, indeed, if we were compelled to do that. Their commerce was insignificant prior to the treaty with this country, in 1875, admitting their products into our ports free of duty. Their chief article of export is sugar, and the concessions extended by the treaty gave a powerful impulse to sugar growing on the islands. The attention of American investors had been attracted to the situation and private corporations were organized to control the sugar plantations. Substantially all the sugar plantations of the island

are now in the hands of those corporations and over 75 per cent of the stock is owned by American investors.

It was the influence of those stockholders that procured the treaty. With the enormous advantage secured by the treaty over other sugar-producing countries, the corporate influences induced the Hawaiian Government to negotiate treaties with Japan, China, and other countries to enable the planters to import laborers under the contract system, that they might have cheap labor to cultivate the plantations. Thousands of Japanese and Chinese laborers were brought to the islands under those treaties, and they now constitute the chief industrial force of the country.

With the coolie system of labor and a rebate of duties by this country, the profits of the sugar barons were enormous. The planters have sold substantially the entire product to the sugar refiners' trust in this country, delivered at San Francisco, at a price one-fourth of a cent a pound below the current New York price. The rebate of duty did not cheapen sugar to the consumers in this country, but it was a clear bonus to the sugar planters' trust of Hawaii and the refiners' trust in America. Our trade with the islands last year amounted to \$18,377,000. We purchased from them \$13,687,000 of products, mostly sugar, and sold them goods to the amount of \$4,690,000. We paid them about \$9,000,000 more than we received from them, and in addition, the rebate of duties we gave them for the privilege of purchasing their sugar at the same rate we could have gotten it from other countries amounted to \$5,354,512.80.

What did the people of this country receive for this enormous concession? Not a farthing, outside of the sugar trust. We gave more in the way of rebate by over \$600,000 than our entire sales to them amounted to. In other words, we paid the people of those islands full market price for their sugar, the same as if no rebate had been granted. We gave them \$4,690,000 of our products and \$600,000 in cash in addition! That is called a commercial reciprocity treaty! The reciprocity feature is a fiction. If the sugar planters and refiners had sufficient influence to bring about that treaty and the treaties between Hawaii and Japan and China respecting contract labor in 1875, if they had the two Governments by the throat then, why have they not power enough to accomplish political union between them in 1898?

IS THE SUGAR TRUST AGAINST ANNEXATION?

Why, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen tell us that the American sugar trust is opposing annexation, and therefore we ought to establish it. Questions of this magnitude ought to be settled by reason, and not by prejudice. It is not very complimentary to the statesmanship of this body to attempt to influence its action by considerations of that kind. But what is the truth respecting the attitude of the sugar trust toward the scheme? Agents of that institution are men of adroitness, and they know well enough that if they openly espoused a measure it would have to be exceptionally meritorious to muster votes enough to prevail. They fully appreciate the intensity of the prejudice against that organization, and if they desire a proposition to succeed they can not help it more than by ostensibly opposing it.

But where do the interests of that organization lie? For where its treasures are, there will its heart be also. The sugar refiners' trust receives directly about one fourth of the bonus granted by the Government to the Hawaiian sugar, and it is known that officers of the trust are large stockholders in the sugar-producing corporations on the islands. The bonus has averaged over \$3,000,000 a year since

the date of the treaty, and has aggregated the enormous sum of \$65,000,000. A sum more than sufficient to buy every foot of land in the islands taken from the pockets of the people of this country without any compensatory return! The treaty is liable to be abrogated at any time and this immense source of revenue cut off. It is the umbilical cord through which the sugar-growing barons and the refiners' trust have been absorbing nourishment, and they can not afford to have it severed.

Annexation would secure free markets in this country and all the benefits enjoyed under the treaty, and in addition it would secure stability of government on the islands. Without going into the ethical questions involved in the proposition to annex, it must be admitted that the existing government is not deeply rooted in the affections of the people and a revolt is liable to occur at any time. By annexation they would secure open markets and a stable government, two factors highly essential to the sugar interests. The commerce of the islands has been largely developed under the impetus of the treaty and depends for its maintenance upon the extension of the treaty or annexation. Our trade with any foreign country might be vastly increased by similar one-sided concessions, but we would soon grow poor under that kind of traffic.

But, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen assure us that annexation would put an end to the contract-labor system on the islands. Would it? Let us examine that question briefly. In the first place, if it did, the planters could afford to pay twice as high a rate of wages as they are paying under the present system, and then have an annual bonus over legitimate profits of \$2,000,000. But American labor never will cultivate the sugar plantations on those islands, and unless Mongolians and South Sea Islanders are employed they will go uncultivated. White labor will never contest with the half-civilized hordes of the Orient and the Pacific islands for industrial supremacy in that field, and natives and coolies must do the work. They are immunes; it is their element; and the cheap-labor system can never be terminated without materially impairing production. The sugar barons and refiners know this, and they know that production will not be stopped.

This is foreshadowed in President McKinley's message submitting the annexation treaty to the Senate in these words:

What the conditions of such a union shall be, the political relation thereof to the United States, the character of the local administration, the quality and degree of the elective franchise of the inhabitants, the extension of the Federal laws to the territory, or the enactment of special laws to fit the peculiar condition thereof, the regulation, if need be, of the labor system therein, are all matters which the treaty has wisely relegated to Congress.

The labor system will be regulated to meet the peculiar conditions on the islands. That is, the coolie system will be permitted, because of the inability to procure other labor. The sugar barons know what that means. They know what regulation of the labor system and laws of the United States is required by the "peculiar condition." By annexation they would secure everything to be desired, and with their monopoly of the interest they would go on accumulating millions upon millions at the expense of the citizens of this country. I firmly believe that much of the annexation sentiment is inspired by the sugar barons on the islands and the sugar refiners of this country. I am convinced that if the treaty had to run for a quarter of a century yet the Hawaiian authorities would not have proposed annexation.

Last year there were 28,782 laborers employed on the sugar plantations, and only 1,617 of them were natives. There were 12,823 Japanese, 6,289 Chinese, 2,268 Portuguese, and 715 of other nationalities.

ties, nearly all under the contract system, and not an American amongst them. Great solicitude is expressed by gentlemen for the high minded Americans who are said to have gone to the Islands to carry with them the beauties of American civilization. We are told that they have rescued the islands from heathenism and educated and Christianized the natives. There doubtless have gone to that benighted people many worthy representatives of our Christian civilization; but of those who are there actively urging the scheme of annexation we know they have gotten substantially all the productive resources in their clutches; they have monopolized the Government; they have overrun the natives with sun-worshippers from the South Sea Islands and pagan coolies from China and Japan, that they might grow rich from their cheap sweat and toil.

Those high-minded gentlemen have overturned established institutions and fixed upon the people an industrial system hardly a degree above absolute slavery. They are entitled to sympathy and encouragement indeed! The Saviour stigmatized better men as thieves and robbers and scourged them out of the Temple. Are we, Mr. Speaker, to be made the tools of these designing mercenaries and loan the great forces of our Government to enable them to further prey upon helplessness?

What possible interest has the American Sugar Trust in defeating the scheme of annexation? Hawaiian sugar has come to our markets free of duty for twenty five years, and annexation would only make the arrangement permanent. That sugar comes here in a raw state, and the trust does all the refining. The Hawaiian Sugar Trust is behind the whole scheme, and it is prolific of resources. Under the tariff law of 1890 duties were removed from sugar, and Hawaii had no advantage in our markets over other sugar-growing countries. A bounty was paid to American sugar growers, and the Hawaiian barons had the audacity to set forces in motion with the view of effecting annexation so they could share in the bounty. Local disturbances were created, and the revolution of 1893 occurred and was made the pretext for immediate tender of dominion to this country. There is scarcely a doubt that that revolution was encouraged by the sugar planters for the purpose of effecting political union with this country and securing a bounty on their sugar product. In 1889 Mr. Merrill, who was our minister to the Hawaiian Government, wrote:

It is noticeable that among the American residents in Hawaii there are several who, from personal motives, contemplate with satisfaction periodical disquietude in the Kingdom, hoping that frequent revolutionary epochs will force the United States Government to make these islands a part of its territory. * * * In order to keep affairs in as much turmoil as possible, baseless rumors are constantly put in circulation, many of which find publication in other countries.

Under the terms of the treaty of annexation negotiated by President Harrison the Hawaiian planters were assured the benefits of our bounty law. Minister Stevens, under date of February 1, 1893, wrote Secretary of State Foster:

As to terms of "annexation," I still adhere firmly to the opinion that the sugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian planters should be limited to 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton.

A bounty of \$12 a ton on an output of 250,000 tons a year, paid by the people of this country to the Hawaiian sugar barons! Three millions of dollars a year from American sweat and toil! Is it any wonder the oligarchy was keen to surrender the sovereignty of the islands to this country? They were willing to sell the birthright of the inoffensive natives, which they had gotten by artifice, for three millions a year of American gold. As far back as 1873 the same schemers were at work attempting to secure free markets in

this country. They were willing to surrender the most sacred rights of the people for gain. General Schofield, who is so frequently quoted by the friends of annexation, wrote from the islands in 1873 these words:

The great object of the Hawaiian Government in seeking a reciprocity treaty with the United States has been, and will probably continue to be, to relieve the sugar planters from the operation of our tariff on their sugar. * * * Indeed, the sugar planters are so anxious for a reciprocity treaty, or so anxious, rather, for "free trade" in sugar with the United States, that many of them openly proclaim themselves in favor of "annexation" of these islands to the United States.

That, Mr. Speaker, clearly exposes the motives and methods of the Hawaiian oligarchy in seeking annexation. Greed is their motive, and disingenuousness their method. I deplore the existence of the American Sugar Trust, but as between it and the Hawaiian trust my sympathies are with the American, for it does employ intelligent labor and contributes somewhat to the support of free institutions, while, on the other hand, the Hawaiian trust employs none but cheap Asiatic labor and contributes to the maintenance of the coolie industrial system.

Hawaii is the paradise of commercial jobbers; it is the worst trust-ridden country of the hemisphere; its commerce, its production, its politics, and its conscience are all controlled by corporations. Do we need it? Is there a necessity for any more trusts in our country? We are asked to assume the Hawaiian public debt, amounting to \$1,000,000, and remit taxes amounting to over \$6,000,000 a year for all time. Can we afford to pay that immense price for the slight benefit we would derive from control of the islands? And that is only the beginning, for there will be forts, fortifications, ocean cables, mail contracts, warships, enlarged armies and navies, and the Lord only knows what all!

THE SUGAR-BEET INDUSTRY.

A new impulse has been given to beet-sugar production in this country by the existing tariff law, and it is confidently hoped that in the near future American farmers will grow all of the sugar required for our consumption. Our farmers can never compete with Hawaiian sugar growers, with their advantages of climate and coolie labor, and the effect will be either to retard beet-sugar production here or continue to put enormous profits in the coffers of the Hawaiian sugar barons at the expense of American consumers. We can afford neither. Those islands produce annually about 250,000 tons of sugar—over one-sixth of our entire importation. The farmers and wage earners of this country, who constitute the power and glory of our civilization, stand as a unit against annexation.

The question for us to decide is, Will we legislate in favor of the millions of farmers and laborers of America, who support our institutions, or in favor of the sugar barons of the Hawaiian Islands, who have been preying upon our substance like commercial cormorants for the last quarter of a century? I am for the farmers and laborers of this country.

THE STRATEGICAL QUESTION.

The principal argument in support of annexation is that the islands are so located that they would constitute a valuable naval outpost and would be especially dangerous to our Pacific coast in the hands of a hostile power.

They are declared to be the key to the Pacific Ocean, and we are told that if we do not annex them, since they are so generously tendered to us, that we will have no right to object to their occupancy by some other country. It is the same old story that was told when we had under consideration the proposition to purchase the Island of St. Thomas of Denmark during President Johnson's

Administration and the proposition to annex Santo Domingo during President Grant's Administration. They were a key to something or some place, and we needed them for strategical reasons and to develop commerce.

President Grant, the greatest military genius of the century, threw all the weight of his personal, professional, and political influence in favor of acquiring Santo Domingo, and failed. He demonstrated its necessity from a military standpoint, and the danger of allowing it to go into the hands of a foreign power. He expatiated upon its peculiar advantages in developing South American trade, and solemnly warned the country that if we failed to annex it a European power stood ready to pay \$2,000,000 for Samana Bay alone, and that it would be sold. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and the subject was dropped altogether out of politics. Samana Bay is still there under the same control, and our sense of security has not been disturbed a particle by our failure to acquire it. Our trade with South America has continued to develop, and no one now thinks the country made a mistake in refusing to adopt the recommendations of President Grant.

The same old argument has been resurrected, galvanized over, and made to do service in support of the proposition to annex the Hawaiian Islands. It is supported by the opinions of a number of very respectable naval experts, who are fertile in theory and barren in experience, but they fail to make a better case for the pending project than that greater military expert, President Grant, made in favor of Santo Domingo twenty-five years ago. It is not an expert question, and must be settled by the application of common-sense rules and principles. The political, industrial, and economical phases of the proposition should receive attention as well as the strategical. While I have a high regard for the opinions of naval experts on expert propositions, they are more than human if their judgments are not highly colored by professional training. A long course of study of one branch of government is apt to lead to an exaggerated estimation of its relative importance.

Mr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman allow a question?

Mr. CRUMPACKER. I prefer not to yield.

Mr. TAWNEY. I only wanted to ask the gentleman whether there is any relation whatever between the policy which the Government of the United States has pursued in the past with respect to the islands of Hawaii and our policy with regard to San Domingo, of which the gentleman has just been speaking.

Mr. CRUMPACKER. Yes; I think they are all within the range of the Monroe doctrine. And I will take occasion to say right here—

Mr. TAWNEY. Just one word further. Have we ever maintained the policy of not allowing other nations to interfere with San Domingo as we have done with respect to the islands of Hawaii for the last half a century?

Mr. CRUMPACKER. We have, most assuredly. Those islands are within the range of the Monroe doctrine; and if now we should permit the Sandwich Islands to go into the hands of a foreign power we should still be infinitely safer on the Pacific coast, according to the opinion of all naval and military experts, than we are on the Atlantic; and everybody in the country knows that we are in no danger whatever on the Atlantic coast. [Applause.]

Mr. GIBSON. Wait till we get into war with a country that has a navy, and you will find out whether our Atlantic coast is in danger.

Mr. CRUMPACKER. The countries that have great navies are so weakened in their domestic situation that they do not dare to go

to war. They have jealousies at home. Spain has none, because she is too small and inconsequential.

There are numerous islands in much closer proximity to our eastern coast than the Hawaiians are to the western, and we do not own a single one of them; they are owned largely by European powers, and yet we apprehend no danger from that source. In fact, the Hawaiian Islands are substantially as far from our western shores as Europe is from our eastern, and with all of our years of experience and intercourse I doubt if we would have Europe moved farther away if we could. Are islands in the hands of a foreign power a greater menace to us on the west side than on the east? If so, for what reason?

Would the Hawaiian Islands, under the control of Great Britain, be a source of greater danger to the Pacific coast than the Bermudas, only a few hundred miles away, are to the Atlantic coast? Contingencies may arise that would make the islands of some importance to us as a base of naval operations; conditions might exist under which their occupancy by a foreign power would be a matter of some concern to us. But the question is, Are those contingencies and conditions so likely to exist as to justify us in departing from our historical policy and entering upon the dangerous experiment of territorial expansion? Would they not bring us more evil than good? Six months ago no one would have dreamed of the highly sensational naval conflict that recently occurred at the Philippine Islands.

If that brilliant event could have been foreseen, naval experts would have been profuse in theories favoring the acquisition of territory for strategical purposes in the Orient. Warfare is a succession of surprises, and no wisdom has foresight enough to know where the next battle will be fought. Naval warfare must make its own facilities; it is not within the range of reason that we should acquire possessions all over the globe for naval depots. There are stronger reasons for the acquisition of territory on the continent of Asia for naval purposes than in the center of the Pacific Ocean. If we owned those islands we would be compelled to protect them; they are within 2,000 miles of other islands in the South Sea that could be made the base of formidable naval operations. They can not protect themselves, and Pearl Harbor, however well fortified, could only protect the entrance to Oahu. There are six or seven other inhabited islands in the group, with means of ingress and egress more or less adequate, and they could be approached and devastated by a naval force. They must be protected and the maintenance of a squadron of warships there would be necessary.

Mr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman name one of those harbors?

Mr. CRUMPACKER. I suggested that there were five or six islands with means of ingress and egress more or less adequate. They are approached by commercial agencies; they can be approached by soldiers as well.

Mr. BROMWELL. Will the gentleman allow me to ask—

Mr. CRUMPACKER. I prefer not to be interrupted. In war we would then be compelled to fight in mid ocean, 2,000 miles from our natural stronghold, where our invincible force could not be available. As we are now situated we can select the theater of action; we can withdraw to our coasts or attack an enemy wherever he is exposed. We have no insular territory to defend and consequently can select the battle ground. Do we desire to surrender that important advantage? Spain had a fortified harbor in Manila as strong as Pearl Harbor, and yet there was a Dewey. Are we to learn nothing from Spain's experience? Her naval outpost at the Philippines is

a source of weakness—a cause of her overthrow. She has, in addition, Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Canaries to defend, all far removed from her continental stronghold, and she is helpless.

In the present conflict we can choose the battlefield. We can attack her most vulnerable point. If she had no insular possessions she could withdraw to the continent and be almost invincible against our arms, and yet gentlemen insist that such possessions are a source of military strength. If it had not been for her islands Spain would not have been involved in the war. That is a point of no mean significance. England, with her mighty navy, is compelled to distribute it around over the world so that it can hardly be said to be formidable. The more naval outposts and supply depots a country has scattered over the seas in time of war the more its naval power must be divided. Outlying possessions give rise to complications in ways that can not be foreseen, and that country is safest from disturbance that has the fewest of them, and it is strongest in time of war. They excite jealousies and distrust and breed misunderstandings; they afford a pretext for burdening the productive energies of a country with a large army and navy, and handicap it in the conquest of trade.

But friends of the proposition express the fear that if we continue to maintain the policy of excluding foreign control of the islands we will be involved in dangerous complications with other powers which would be averted by annexation. What has been our experience in that line? During all our relations with the islands we have had infinitely less trouble with them and on their account than we have had with Alaska since our purchase of that Territory. There is now a judgment of half a million dollars standing against us growing out of complications brought with the Alaskan possessions—more than Hawaii has cost us in all her history. It is conclusively demonstrated that annexation multiplies perplexities from which we could otherwise be free.

But, Mr. Speaker, we are told that if we control the Hawaiian Islands our Pacific coast will be secure from attack, because no war ship can carry coal enough to steam from any other port on the Pacific Ocean, do any fighting, and return. Naval engagements are usually of short duration; a few hours are sufficient to destroy a mighty fleet, so destructive are the implements of warfare. We have existed with safety for a hundred years without control of the Hawaiian Islands, and they grow of less importance to us with every improvement of war ships.

Russia just contracted for a number of war ships and cruisers, some of which are to be constructed by American contractors, and they are to have capacity enough to carry coal to steam from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur, a distance of 17,000 miles. A ship of that capacity could leave Hongkong and run to the Pacific coast, bombard the coast cities for a week, and return without any inconvenience. It could demolish every city on the coast outside of Alaska and have time to spare. With continued improvement and the prospect of revolution in motive power by electricity, warships are likely to be constructed within the next decade that will carry supplies enough to circumnavigate the globe. Our strength is in our isolation and a patriotic citizenship, and our shield is in an attitude of dignity and justice toward all mankind.

The policy of territorial expansion will necessarily involve us in complications in foreign politics, with which we should have no concern. We need no additional territory for any of the purposes of peace, and war is justified only when there is no other honorable recourse. If we intend to annex the islands at all, it would be most unwise to consummate the act in the face of the present situation.

Statesmanship will not be misled by the prevailing excitement to do that which might materially cripple us in the prosecution of the present war. We have a foothold on the Philippine Islands, and indiscreet declarations are heard on all hands, that it shall be our policy to permanently occupy them. Foreign countries are apt to misjudge our purposes. Precipitate annexation would be looked upon as a movement preliminary to the complete subjugation of the Philippines, and would be construed as the inauguration of an aggressive policy of territorial expansion. It would excite the apprehension of European powers and lose us their moral support, and perhaps invite intervention against us; our pretension of humanity would be justly regarded as hypocritical cant.

We have our Monroe doctrine, the existence of which is recognized the world over, and by force of an analogous law controlling the politics of the Old World the powers would find abundant justification to intervene and rebuke what they would regard as audacity on the part of this Government.

THE "WAR NECESSITY."

There is nothing in the exigencies of the present war that requires the annexation of the islands. Our occupation of the Philippines, if our protestations and professions are to be regarded, will be only temporary. Unless we permit the war to degenerate from a righteous movement for the relief of oppressed humanity into a greedy conquest for colonial spoils, our military foothold in the Orient will soon terminate. The only need we have for Hawaii now is for a supply station on the line of communication between the continent and the Philippines, and that we have already in our unqualified right to Pearl Harbor for that purpose. Our right to that harbor is complete and exclusive, and our use of it, under the terms of the grant, can not possibly involve the Hawaiian Government in complications, because it has no control over the harbor as against this country.

The grant is in these terms:

His majesty, the King of the Hawaiian Islands, grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.

If the grant should be terminable with the treaty, which is a debatable question, it could not be terminated by either party under a year, and that, in all probability, will be as long as we will be required to maintain our force in the Philippines, unless it shall be the intention to continue to occupy those islands for the purpose of coercing annexation. The possibility of the Hawaiian Government terminating the treaty is too remote to be worthy of consideration unless the oligarchy should conclude to take the preliminary step in the existing crisis in the hope that it would compel annexation. The stream of gold, at the rate of \$6,000,000 a year, flowing from this country into the pockets of the sugar barons in Hawaii is an adequate guaranty that the treaty will continue.

I have no doubt there are influential citizens of those islands who would gladly involve their Government in the existing complications with the view of promoting the scheme of annexation. Let that Government declare neutrality between the belligerents and its declaration, if honestly kept, will be respected. Let this country depend upon its grant for the use of Pearl Harbor for a supply station and the question will be solved. We will have all that we require and Hawaii will be entirely free from the controversy.

And, besides this, it is an undeniable fact that there is a feasible route from San Francisco to the Philippines by way of our Aleutian possessions which is over 800 miles shorter than the Hawaiian route. It is always open and practicable, and possesses as safe, convenient, and adequate a harbor and supply station as Pearl Harbor. The temperature in the coldest weather is never lower than 7° Fahrenheit, and it very rarely reaches that point. But there have been no sugar kings on the Aleutians to advertise their advantages; consequently that important line has been almost overlooked by the country. It answers every purpose of a supply station in supporting our forces in the Philippines, and we already own it.

Mr. TAWNEY. I suppose the gentleman knows that Pearl Harbor can not be entered by a single vessel at the present time, owing to the bar.

Mr. CRUMPACKER. I know that the Hawaiian Government has permitted us to store 12,000 or more tons of coal in an accessible harbor, and will subject herself to no liability whatever under the laws of nations in permitting us to go and take that coal.

Mr. TAWNEY. That is in the harbor of Honolulu. The gentleman was talking of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CRUMPACKER. It can make no difference; when we placed our coal there we acquired the right to go after it.

THE ISLANDS WILL NOT GO TO ANOTHER COUNTRY.

But if we don't take the islands some other country will, is the alternative that is submitted to us by the advocates of the proposition. Suppose Mexico should propose political union with this country and notify us that if the proposition were not accepted she would tender a surrender of her sovereignty to France or Germany; do gentlemen confess that we would be remediless? Are they willing to have the Monroe doctrine so construed and limited? I imagine not. We do not want Mexico in our political household, and would resist any proposition that placed her under the control of any European power. The same is true in relation to the Hawaiian Islands. If we do not choose to accept them we will not be estopped to prevent their passing under the dominion of any foreign power. But there is no danger of such a contingency. The specter of foreign control is conjured up for the purpose of exciting our cupidity and apprehension.

Have we forgotten San Domingo so quickly? The sugar barons of the islands, who constitute the governing power, realize full well that union with any foreign country would mean the abrogation of the commercial treaty and the loss of their great advantage in the American markets. It would cost them over \$5,000,000 a year, and that they will never submit to willingly. There is no liability of their proposing annexation to any other country, and if any power should attempt to take them by conquest this country would immediately prevent it. That fact is a guaranty of their safety from foreign molestation, as no government will take the hazard of a war with this country to possess those islands. There is absolutely no force in the suggestion that they are becoming orientalized and will ultimately go to Japan by absorption.

The Japanese and Chinese laborers on the islands were brought there by the sugar barons under the contract system. Thousands of them were imported by the Dole oligarchy. They are there for fixed terms, and are required to return to their own country when the term of service expires. The treaties require the Hawaiian Government to guarantee the performance of the contracts, and to furnish them transportation back to their homes at the termination of the period of employment. They are not naturalized, and have no polit-

ical rights. They do not have their families, and are only sojourners. This accounts for the large discrepancy between the sexes on the islands. The sugar growers need their labor, and there is no sentiment for their exclusion.

Japan has evinced no disposition to seize the islands. It is true she protested against annexation to this country, because it would dissolve the Hawaiian sovereignty and destroy the guaranty under the Japanese treaty. Japan quite likely has some concern on account of the well-known hostility of this country toward Mongolian immigration. There need be no fear whatever of annexation to or absorption by any other country as long as we protest. Our protest alone, of which the world already has notice, is a sufficient guaranty of their safety and neutrality.

The operations of European powers in China is a cause for no apprehension on the part of this country. Europe is no more dangerous in Asia than it is in Europe. It is in easy access to our eastern coast, and has given us no disturbance, and it will be equally as harmless in Asia.

HAWAII AND THE PACIFIC COMMERCE.

Mr. Speaker, much importance is attached to the islands because of their relation to the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. There is no reason why we can not fully enjoy their benefits from a commercial standpoint without annexation. We can not hope to profitably extend our foreign trade by the policy of territorial expansion. Commerce has no sentiment or affection—the ethics of international trade are those of the bargain counter—and the country that has the greatest advantages in production will control the greatest share of the world's trade. We already have Pearl Harbor for a coaling station. All civilized countries are engaged in trade, and they gladly welcome cargoes of commerce into their ports and readily extend hospitalities to the carrying vessels.

It is not necessary that we have a coaling station in our own right wherever we send a trading vessel. Ships are provided with coal in the various parts of the world with as much alacrity as their crews are provided with entertainment at the hotels. What would be thought of the proposition to maintain a United States shoe store in London, so Americans traveling abroad could procure footwear? How many foreign countries have coaling stations upon our coasts? Where have our ships gone on commercial missions that they have had any difficulty in procuring coal if any was to be had?

Who is ready to confess, in the face of our marvelous growth, that our commercial policy has been a failure? Sir, with high-priced labor and high rate of interest in this country our producers have made wonderful conquests in the world's markets in the last few years. Our foreign trade is increasing at an unparalleled rate, notwithstanding the many disadvantages we labor under and the proverbial wastefulness of the American people. The manufacturing nations of the Old World, by force of habit and surroundings, are compelled to maintain enormously expensive standing armies and navies. It has been said that every toiler in Germany has to carry a soldier or a sailor on his back.

Those countries are badly handicapped by that condition, from which we are now comparatively free. Our isolation is our principal safeguard, and the advantages it contains has enabled us to achieve remarkable triumphs in production and trade. We do not realize the enormous advantage our position gives us, or there would be no sentiment in favor of surrendering it. The burden is so great on foreign countries that they are now contemplating a treaty for the purpose of limiting, by mutual covenant, the size of



their armies and navies. It is shortsighted and suicidal for us to enter upon a policy that will take from us the important advantage we now enjoy.

Our trade can never be extended by cannon or warships, but it will continue to increase until we have achieved commercial supremacy, if we do not surrender the immense advantage we now possess. Our strength is not, and will never be, in our Army and Navy, but in the contentment and intelligence of our citizenship. Our greatest danger is not from external force, but from internal discontent and disintegration. As long as our people are united in sentiment and prosperous we are invincible against the whole world, but if we are torn by discord and shattered by discontent our strength will depart though we have the mightiest navy that ever rode the seas. We are strongest when the burdens of Government are lightest.

I deprecate the policy that would cause this country to take from the multitude their hard-earned substance, so much needed in industrial development, to build a navy equal to those maintained by the European powers. The policy of territorial expansion will compel us to do that. It would be immeasurably better in an emergency to go into the markets of the world to buy war ships and cruisers than to invest millions upon millions of money in times of peace, needed in developing production, to the construction of floating palaces of steel and have them rust and rot on the sea.

A large navy does not, in my judgment, tend to secure peace. Nations, like individuals, often act upon impulse, and if there be time for reflection difficulties may be settled amicably and war obviated. Does any gentleman on this floor contend that it would promote domestic peace for all of our citizens to carry firearms and dirk knives in their daily intercourse? That which is true of individuals is likewise true of nations.

I am in favor of a navy reasonably commensurate with our necessities, considering our isolated situation. I would have war ships sufficient for coast police and defensive purposes and a reasonable nucleus, in addition, for offensive operations; but I would not unnecessarily burden the people of the country for the support of a great navy just for its glory.

If we take the proposed step in this crisis, it will surely launch us upon a policy of territorial aggression and colonial imperialism, carrying complications in all parts of the earth, and our national peace will be constantly threatened. I warn gentlemen that thirst for power is a dangerous passion and hard to satisfy, for it will not be controlled by reason. The appeal to national pride always has a fascination hard to resist, and it is doubly powerful when the public mind is in an abnormal state of excitement, as it is to-day. The wisdom of statesmanship would defer action upon matters of such high importance until the passions of war subside and conditions will permit calm consideration.

This is a Government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," and I have faith in its splendid destiny and am jealous of its great powers, fearful always that they may, through excessive zeal or mistaken judgment, be perverted. Let us try no dangerous or uncertain experiment; let us hesitate to change a policy the success of which is the acknowledged envy of the world; let us profit by the wrecks of nations and individuals who were not satisfied to let well enough alone. [Applause.]